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Overview
Analytic Pragmatism, Inferentialism, and Perception
 This paper located against a debate between contemporary advocates of 
pragmatism and German idealism.
 Robert Brandom: analytic pragmatism  inferentialism. 
Mental content is defined purely in terms of what inferences it licenses 
in a ‘game of giving and asking for reasons’.
 Much in early Peirce also seems inferentialist (e.g. denial of intuition: 
namely “a premise not itself a conclusion”.)
 Issues over ‘strong’ vs ‘hyper-’ inferentialism, particularly vivid w.r.t 
colour concepts. Where Brandom stops short at the former, Peirce 
arguably instantiates the latter (Legg, 2008).
 Paul Redding: the sticking point for analytic pragmatism is making 
sense of experience. Brandom fails to do justice to the way in which in 
perception we form beliefs de re as well as de dicto.
Analytic Pragmatism, Inferentialism, and Perception
 Perceiving a yellow chair seems 
to be something more than, say, 
coming to believe the 
proposition “Chair C is yellow” 
involuntarily. 
 Does Peirce’s pragmatism also 
have an ‘experience problem’?
“Chair C is yellow”
Chair C
Peirce, Inferentialism, and Perception
 Peirce paid considerable attention to perception later in his career 
(~1902-3). 
 In order to highlight the uniqueness of Peirce’s theory, it is contrasted 
with the remarkably different account of Hume. 
 Hume’s theory may be viewed as a high water mark of 
representationalism (understood as the denial of inferentialism), insofar 
as he imagines that every idea is a copy of some simple impression
received from the world directly.
 We will see that Peirce’s theory also has two layers: a percept and a 
perceptual judgment. But they, and their relationship, are very 
different from Hume’s impressions and ideas.
 (Many of the differences derive from Hume’s nominalism, by contrast 
to Peirce’s dedicated scholastic realism.)
Hume’s Theory of Perception: “All Ideas which are Different, 
are Separable”
 Hume offers an essentially mechanistic account of 
perception, modelling direct causal contact between 
the mind and objects both ‘internal’ and ‘external’. 
 This contact somehow generates impressions and 
ideas. 
 The difference between these two consists merely in 
“the degrees of force and liveliness, with 
which they strike upon the mind, and make 
their way into our thought or 
consciousness” (Treatise, 1, I, i, p. 1). 
 Ideas are less “lively” copies taken by the mind of 
impressions  something like a stamp and its 
imprint.
Hume’s Theory of Perception: “All Ideas which are Different, 
are Separable”
This is obviously a metaphor, but one which arguably 
captures two important features of perception for 
Hume:
 1) It is direct. It has no intermediary, for instance 
in other, rational, faculties of the mind. 
 Ironically, this creates the famous ‘veil of ideas’, or 
Humean phenomenalism, since one cannot ‘think 
behind’ one’s impressions of the world and form 
other ideas about it, because all ideas are copies of 
impressions. 
 Nevertheless in the impression-forming process the 
mind is envisaged to directly confront the 
world. And surely this (in some form) is what 
perception must consist in? 
Hume’s Theory of Perception: “All Ideas which are Different, 
are Separable”
2) The process is determinate. Impressions and 
ideas are particulars possessed of a determinate set 
of features copied precisely and wholesale.
 Hume argues for this claim phenomenologically by 
mentally comparing one of his impressions and its 
corresponding idea and arguing that no features 
have been lost: When I shut my eyes and think 
of my chamber, the ideas I form are exact 
representations of the impressions I felt; nor 
is there any circumstance of the one, which 
is not to be found in the other (Treatise, 1, I, i, 
p. 3)
 (One might legitimately query the introspective 
research methodology here. But the quote is 
illustrative.)
Hume’s Theory of Perception: “All Ideas which are Different, 
are Separable”
3) Hume’s impressions and ideas are temporal 
particulars. They occur at a particular time–point 
and there is no temporal duration within the 
impression or idea itself. 
• Within the Humean perspective this very notion 
sounds bizarre and unmotivated. Nevertheless it will 
be returned to...
The Experience –Truth Gap
 A significant problem for any philosophy of perception is how to 
reconcile two aspects of the mind’s encounter with the world which seem 
rather different and opposed: 
1) My perceptions are suffused with immediately felt experience (for 
instance, the juicy, sweet ‘cherryness’ of a cherry I am biting into) which 
it seems that in some important sense ‘no-one can take away from me’. 
The nature of our sensory feels appears to enjoy some degree of 
indubitability. (“Even if that cherry was a total hallucination, I 
can’t be wrong about how it tasted to me.”) 
2) Much of the point of perception seems to be to enable us to endorse 
new propositions about the world that are truth-apt. (“This 
cherry is delicious! But is it really a cherry, or rather a small 
plum?”) In this way our perceptions seem perfectly dubitable. 
 This is all rather confusing. We might dub this The Experience-Truth 
Gap in perception. 
Intermediary Perceptual Objects
 Thus, in philosophy of perception one traditionally encounters talk of 
seemings, sense-data, and other like entities, which are postulated as 
further objects of perception than the real-world objects allegedly being 
perceived. 
 What is said about the intermediary objects is then treated as bearing 
the full weight of perception’s apparent indubitability.
 What is said about the real-world objects is treated as bearing the full 
weight of perception’s apparent dubitability. 
 For classic texts, see (Russell, 1912) (Ayer, 1958). For a particularly 
nuanced account, see (Sellars, 1982). For a probing critique of the 
framework, see (McDowell, 1994) 
Intermediary Perceptual Objects
 However, postulating these intermediary objects arguably doesn’t solve 
the Experience-Truth Gap. 
 If the role of representing sensory feels is given over entirely to the 
intermediary objects, delicate issues emerge concerning which of the 
qualities of those objects are primary (had by intermediary and real-
world objects) and which merely secondary (had by intermediary 
objects alone), leading to scepticism about whether there are any 
primary qualities, or any that can be known.
 Meanwhile, if the role of logically assessability is given over entirely to 
statements about putative real world objects, we seem to be deprived of 
sufficient contact with them to be able to assess them properly. 
 (British Empiricism seeks to paper over the breach by designing its key 
concept of an idea to play the dual role of both representing sensory 
feels and being logically assessable).
Peirce’s Theory of Perception: “Nothing at all...is absolutely 
confrontitional”
 I will now discuss the detailed theory of 
perception which Charles Peirce developed 
around 1902-3.
 By contrast to the British Empiricists’ use of 
ideas to model both immediate experience 
and truth-apt propositions derived from 
that experience, Peirce suggests that we 
need separate, though interlocking, 
accounts of these two things. 
 The first becomes his account of the 
percept, the second his account of the 
perceptual judgment.
The Percept
 The percept comprises a felt quality and the vividness with which it is 
presented. Neither of these is ‘cognitive’. The percept is not a Humean 
idea. Nor does it express truth-claims. 
 It “…does not stand for anything. It obtrudes itself upon my 
gaze; but not as a deputy for anything else, not ‘as’ anything. 
It simply knocks at the portal of my soul and stands there in 
the doorway.” (7.619). 
 Peirce notes that one might call the percept an “image”, except that an 
image is often taken to represent something other than itself, and the 
percept does not do that (CP 7.619). Nevertheless it has insistency: along 
three dimensions:
 It contributes something positive to my thinking
 It compels my thinking
 It is not reasonable: “…it does not address the reason, nor appeal to 
anything for support” (CP 7.622).
The Percept
 The percept also has a definiteness, along two dimensions:
 It is individual: the percept pertains to some particular chair and no other.
 It is perfectly explicit: all of its determinables are determinate. 
 Thus the yellowness of the chair-percept will be some perfectly specific 
colour, such as a pale saffron, whereas the predicate ‘yellow’, in the 
proposition, ‘Chair C is yellow due to its wide usage, must be more 
general.
Also, whereas the perceptual judgment 
with its chosen colour-predicate makes 
no comment on other ‘chair-
determinables’, such as shape, these 
will exist in the percept too.
The Perceptual Judgment
 The perceptual judgment has propositional structure. E.g. “Chair C is 
yellow”. Therefore the percept has an integration which cannot be 
possessed by the perceptual judgment:
 “The judgment, ‘This chair appears yellow’, separates the 
color from the chair, making the one predicate and the other 
subject. The percept, on the other hand, presents the chair in 
its entirety and makes no analysis whatever” (7.631). 
 The perceptual judgment therefore cannot be a copy of the percept, as 
they are too unlike one another.
 They are: “…as unlike... as the printed letters in a book, where 
a Madonna of Murillo is described, are unlike the picture 
itself” (5.54).
The Perceptual Judgment
 As the perceptual judgment expresses a 
proposition which can be true or false, its 
interpretation is thrown open to the 
community of inquiry (or logical space), to 
which each judgment properly belongs, i.e.: 
“…an endless series of judgments, 
each member of which is logically 
related to prior members” (Forster, p. 
120)
 These inquirers may develop the meaning of  
yellow and chair in unanticipated ways....
Questions Arising
 Despite its pathways into public discourse, however, the perceptual 
judgement compels assent as much as the percept. If I open my eyes in 
front of a yellow chair I cannot avoid having certain sensory 
experiences. In the same way, neither can I avoid judging “This is a 
yellow chair”, if I have the appropriate concepts. 
 But how is it possible that the perceptual judgment produce such 
compulsive belief? Doesn’t this endow it with a form of de facto
indubitability? 
 We have just noted that the perceptual judgment opens out logically 
into the community of inquiry, in which inquirers doubt and correct 
their beliefs. Surely it cannot be both dubitable and indubitable 
at the same time? 
 Also, how do the percept and perceptual judgment relate to one 
another? How is it possible for the perceptual judgment to 
represent the percept, if they are so different? 
Superficial Initial Answer: The Percept Subsequently Doubted 
and Dismissed
 Re. dubitability of perception. This is an important objection. 
 A superficial initial answer might point out a temporal dimension to the 
belief-forming process, and note that the perceptual judgment is 
indubitable at the time, but might be corrected subsequently in the light 
of further percepts. (“For an instant I saw a yellow chair in the 
corner. But when I blinked and looked again I only saw 
floorboards. Therefore I infer that what previously appeared 
to me as a perception of a yellow chair was in fact a 
hallucination, and I choose to ignore it.”) 
But we will see that in Peirce’s 
philosophy the temporal mediation of 
what we perceive applies on a yet 
profounder level.
The Relation between Percept and Perceptual Judgment: The 
Percipuum
 Re. Relation between percept and perceptual judgment: The 
British empiricists were too unimaginative in assuming that the only 
possible relation between impression and idea was one of copying. It is 
not a relation of copying.
 Peirce notes that it is not a logical relation either, since this would 
require that the percept serve as some kind of premise from which the 
perceptual judgment is inferred, and we have seen that the percept is 
not in propositional form.
 But what other kind of relation could there be??
 Peirce claims that percepts cause perceptual judgements, while 
not being the source of their content. In other words, the 
perceptual judgment is an index, or “true symptom” of the percept, 
just as a weathercock is a true symptom of the direction of the wind.
 What does this mean? How does it work? 
The Relation between Percept and Perceptual Judgment: The 
Percipuum
 The human mind is organised such that each percept causes  “direct 
and uncontrollable interpretations”. This mediating relation 
between a percept and its perceptual judgment Peirce calls the 
percipuum. 
 This process of causing interpretations cannot be willed. But it can be 
trained and perfected via the cultivation of appropriate mental 
habits.
 As we all know, parents train children to apply predicates useful in 
daily life (“food”, “bath”, “red”...). Over time, children learn how to 
produce correct judgments about their environment, aided by whatever 
perceptual experiences they notice reliably correlate with them. But the 
exact nature of the experiences themselves  in Wittgenstein’s famous 
phrase  may be ‘divided through’ as irrelevant.
The Experience-Truth Gap Mediated
 The answer to the Experience-Truth Gap in philosophy of perception is 
not to split the object of perception in two – postulating one object that 
is unreal but is actually perceived, and a second object that is real but 
‘lies behind’ the first and is only inferred. 
 Rather than two objects, the answer is time. 
 The percipuum is not a temporal particular. It occurs across a time-
span which has at its ‘back end’ a memory of the immediate past (which
Peirce calls the ponecipuum) and at its ‘front end’ an expectation of
the immediate future (the antecipuum).
 This time-span  of effectively infinitesimal duration  forms a ‘moving
window’ in which each new perception enters the mind at the ‘front
end’ in the form of anticipation just as the most recent falls back into
memory. This internal structure is what endows the perception with its
meaning.
P1 P2 P3
P1 P2 P3 P4
P1   P2     P3 P4 P5 
Perception at t1
Perception at t2
Perception at t3…
LEGEND:
Ponecipuum
Percipuum
Antecipuum
Time
Awareness
These are not three consciously 
experienced stages in perception but 
analytical tools. Rosenthal: they are 
“…not the building blocks of 
perception but a verification level 
brought about by a change of focus 
when a problem arises” (p. 4)
Deeper True Analysis of Perceptual Indubitability
 We may now examine the promised deeper analysis of the 
indubitability of perceptual judgments. 
 It is presented by Rosenthal in an acute analysis of this difficult passage 
by Peirce:
Now let us take up the perceptual judgment “This wafer 
looks red.” It takes some time to write this sentence, to utter 
it, or even to think it. It must refer to the state of the percept 
at the time that it, the judgment, began to be made. But the 
judgment does not exist until it is completely made. It thus 
only refers to a memory of the past; and all memory is 
possibly fallible and subject to criticism and control. (CP 
5.544, 1903)
Deeper True Analysis of Perceptual Indubitability
 Rosenthal interprets this as saying that the perceptual judgment is 
indubitable not in the sense that doubts about it can be answered with 
certain knowledge, but in the “pragmatic” sense that doubts about it 
cannot coherently be formulated:
…to doubt it is to put into question something for which 
there is no tool for getting “behind” it to compare it with 
anything more fundamental. For us it must itself be the final 
court of appeal. The apprehension of an appearance is not 
certainly true as opposed to possibly false. It is “certain” in 
the sense that neither truth nor falsity is applicable to it…for 
what the percipuum is is determined only in its recognition 
and can be determined in no other way. It becomes a 
“repetition” of previous contents only by being assimilated 
to those contents in the perceptual judgment
Deeper True Analysis of Perceptual Indubitability
 To explore this further, let us return to the case of the disappearing 
yellow chair percept. 
 Our initial analysis of this scenario held that we have two distinct 
percepts: the first percept judged ‘yellow-chair-like’ and the second 
percept judged to represent only floorboards. 
 On the basis of such a mismatch, so close together in time, I infer that 
the first percept is a hallucination and so I both remember and 
disregard it. 
 But what if a similar sensory event were to happen all the time, with 
yellow chair images momentarily appearing and disappearing without a 
trace? 
 Would I continue to perceive and disregard them? 

Deeper True Analysis of Perceptual Indubitability
 Peirce suggests, in a discussion of the action of optical illusions on the 
mind over time, that insofar as the yellow chair percepts were regularly
recognized as illusory, they would become much less vivid and possibly 
disappear altogether:
It is one of the recognized difficulties of all psycho-physical 
measurement that the faculties rapidly become educated to 
an extraordinary degree. Thus, contrast-colors, when 
properly exhibited, are incredibly vivid. One is not easily 
persuaded that they are not real. Yet the experimenter 
becomes in time almost incapable of perceiving them. This is 
a case in which the same educational course which gives 
control over appearances which sometimes do and 
sometimes do not accord with the mass of experiences, only 
serves to strengthen the forcefulness of those appearances 
which always do so accord (CP 7.647).

Deeper True Analysis of Perceptual Indubitability
 The contrast-colour illusion involves staring at a bright red patch then 
looking at a white surface, which will initially appear to be green. 
 Over time, as the mind learns that the white surface is ‘not really green’ 
the perceived greenness literally fades. 
 When we study these illusions, they are quite obvious. This enables the 
training of the percept-to-perceptual judgment relation, which largely 
takes place unconsciously in childhood, to be reawakened and studied 
within an observable time-period. 
 The most important thing to note is that the training is a rational 
process. Its guiding force is the mind making the best overall sense it 
can of ponecipuum, percipuum and antecipuum as a total package.
 If that involves imperceptibly reinterpreting something just apparently 
seen as in fact illusory, then so be it. 
Idealism Operationalized
 Hookway puts this point well:  
What we experience is not just a clash between our beliefs 
and our experience; we often experience incoherence within 
the experience itself, which simultaneously involves 
anticipations and thwarts those very anticipations. The fact 
that, in these cases, ‘the perceptual judgment, and the 
percept itself, seems to keep shifting from one general aspect 
to another and back again (CP 5.183) shows that the percept 
is not entirely free from…characters that are proper to 
interpretations (CP 5.184) (Hookway, 2012, p. 17).
 Thus future experience can, at least in part, literally determine 
previous experience. 
 Thus in Peirce’s understanding of perception “nothing at all…is 
absolutely confrontitional”  although he does us the favour of 
adding, “although it is quite true that the confrontitial is 
continually flowing in upon us” (CP, 7.653). 
Idealism Operationalized
 The overall theme of this paper is idealism operationalized – how 
pragmatism might motivate, and explicate, the idea of reality as 
representational. 
 Such “identity between mind and world” is of course one of idealism’s 
defining ideas. It scares many contemporary philosophers. Redding 
well describes how the claim that “fact is independent of 
experience” is part of the creation myth of analytic philosophy (p. 2).
 We might perhaps assuage this by viewing the idea of reality as 
representational in a metaphysical key: as meaning merely that 
predicates have some role to play in ontological commitment. The 
world contains yellowness as well as yellow things. (Surely if the world 
contains yellow things it must also contain yellowness? This is an old, 
old story...)
 But a key challenge for idealism is making sense of perception. Don’t 
we need to posit, and explicate, some primal confrontation between the 
mind and worldly objects?
Idealism Operationalized
 What makes Peirce’s theory of perception an idealism operationalized, 
what makes this a distinctive contribution from pragmatism to 
idealism, is the role played by habit. 
 It is habit (continually refined and corrected) which laces the 
perceptual judgment to the percept over time, enabling the former to 
index the latter. 
 Habit is the ur-ingredient of mental life for the pragmatist, as idea is 
for the British Empiricists. 
 In habit we see the universal ‘from the inside’, not as metaphysical posit 
but as lived (generalising, judging) experience. Within this lived 
experience, the fluidity of the nexus between percept and perceptual 
judgment (and the fact that the fluidity is two-way – percepts 
modifying perceptual judgments and vice versa) can even be exposed –
and itself perceived – with the help of certain optical illusions.   
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